The largest and best known of the fairs was held at Nizhnii Novgorod. 9 It attracted business from all over East Asia, from Persia to China. In 1838, the Nizhnii Novgorod fair had sales of over 130 million rubles.' 0 More formal exchanges were slow to develop in Russia. " [U] nlike in Western Europe, the government, and not the merchantry, took the initiative in creating the first commercial exchange (birzha).""1 That exchange was organized in 1703 by Peter the Great, who had been impressed by the exchanges in London and Amsterdam.' 2 Some twenty years later, he also ordered a new building for that exchange to be constructed on Petersburg Island. 13 The Petersburg exchange relied chiefly on the self-regulation of members for its governance.' 4 Nevertheless, government regulations were imposed on the exchange to prohibit "fighting, spreading unfounded rumors, engaging in political discussions, and trading in paper securities ...... 5 A particularly contentious issue was the setting of trading hours. 16 The trading of futures was also prohibited until 1893.' 7 The Petersburg exchange continued to trade commodities for many years, but it gradually became more predominant in securities trading, listing over 300 securities.' 8 Other commodity exchanges were being created, but their Generations, 1840 -1905 35 (N Ill U Press, 1984 (governing body of Nizhni Novgorod fair asks government to restrict travelling salesmen because they compete unfairly with the fair); Fernand Braudel, 3 The Perspective of the World. Civilization and Capitalism l5th-18th Century 445-46 (Harper & Row, 1979) (description of early trading activities in Russia).
Alfred J. Rieber, Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia 21 (U North Carolina Press, 1982) ("Merchants and Entrepreneurs").
12. Id at 21; Wieczynski, Modern Encyclopedia at 184 (cited in note 7); 3 Great Soviet Encyclopedia 672 (Macmillan, 1973) ("Soviet Encyclopedia") . See also James Mayor, An Economic History of Russia 116-17 (E.P. Dutton, 1914) (discussing the formulation of Peter the Great's economic views as a result of his visit to Western Europe).
13. Wieczynski, Modern Encyclopedia at 184 (cited in note 7). The following is an apt description of the exchanges during this period:
An Exchange was, relatively speaking, like the top section of a fair, but one in permanent session. Because the important businessmen as well a host of intermediaries met here, business of every sort could be transacted: operations in commodities, currency exchange, shareholding, maritime insurance.., and it was also a money market, a finance market and a stock market. Fernand Braudel, 2 The Wheels of Commerce: Civilization and Capitalism 15th-I 8th Century 100 (Harper & Row, 1979 development took over a century. 19 In 1796, for example, the Odessa exchange was established for grain trading. 20 It was followed, at great intervals, by exchange openings in Rybinsk, Nizhnii Novogorod, Kazan, Samara, and Saratov.
2 '
Efforts were undertaken in 1839 to bring the Il'inka street trading of the Moscow merchants indoors, but that process was not completed for some time because the merchants preferred informal trading in the often snowcovered street to the comforts of a formal exchange.
22 " [T] he exchange committee appealed to the chief of police to forbid these gatherings and to put pressure on the shop owners in the bazaar to conform .... -23 but it was not until the 1860s that the Moscow exchange became an important commercial center. 2 4 That role was cemented with the opening of the Moscow Grain Exchange in 1896. 25 Transactions on the Russian exchanges were reported in bulletins, weekly price lists, and newspapers such as the St. Petersburg Exchange Register and the Commercial Gazette, which was published by the Department of Foreign Trade. 2 6 The Russian exchanges, like their European and American counterparts, also began to employ brokers, or middlemen, to facilitate the free flow of business. The government itself used such brokers to handle its grain operations, and brokers proved particularly useful as intermediaries between merchants who did not know or trust each other. Because of the development of exchanges, the Russian economy began to lose some of its dependence on the trade fairs. Many of the trade fairs evolved into exchanges, but some continued to operate through the latter part of the nineteenth century and even into the twentieth. 24. Wieczynski, Modern Encyclopedia at 186 (cited in note 7). The preeminence of the Moscow market was foreshadowed by the important role played by the Moscow merchants in the Russian economy since the 16th and 17th centuries. Joseph T. Fuhrmann, The Origins of Capitalism in Russia 27-28 (Quadrangle Books, 1972) . One observer described trade with Moscow in the 1550s as follows:
[I]n a single morning one might see seven to eight hundred sleds coming and going laden with grain and salt-fish .... Moscow [also] exported grain through merchants who came a thousand miles from the north to exchange fish, furs and hides for that product. Id at 28 (footnote omitted). See also Braudel, 2 The Wheels of Commerce at 32 (cited in note 13) ("Every winter in Moscow when the Moskva river froze, shops, booths and stalls were set up on the ice."); Paul Bushkovitch, The Merchants Of Moscow: 1580 -1650 (Cambridge U Press, 1980 principal differences between the two forms of trading was that sales on the exchanges were generally made on the basis of samples and at fixed prices, rather than by the actual display of goods and haggling common to the fairs. 2 9 The continuing development of the exchanges also caused the government to regulate them more actively. In 1870, the authority to control the organization of markets and exchanges was vested in the municipal public administrations. 30 In the 1890s, however, the national government began asserting greater control over the exchanges, particularly the St. Petersburg exchange, removing much of its self-regulatory authority. At one point, the Ministry of Finance imposed an absurd requirement that a partition be constructed between the securities and commodities markets on the exchange floor. Matters began to deteriorate in Moscow when the exchange there attempted to restrict the autocracy, which resulted in a ban on political discussions. World War I further heightened tensions as the Russian government began to disintegrate. At the commencement of the war, there were 115 securities and commodity exchanges in Russia. 34 Although these exchanges were closed during the war, a black market managed to function.A 5 Hoarding and speculation were widespread. "At the Nizhnyi Novgorod fair speculation had become a mass phenomenon... 'an all-Russian disgrace bearing the stamp of the all-Russian merchantry.' " 36 The October Revolution in 1917 resulted in a prohibition of all securities transactions. 37 The civil war, which lasted from [1918] [1919] [1920] 38 also led to "war communism." Under that program, the Bolsheviks "sought to eliminate private enterprise through the nationalization of land, industry and banks, and through the abolition of private trade and money." 39 speculators, impoverished (or starved) the masses, and threatened to drive Russia back to the days of the old regime.
' 40 Lenin also sought grain from the peasants as a "loan" to the state. 4 1 When that appeal failed, the government adopted forced grain requisitions.
2
These efforts did not eliminate black market transactions or the development of a barter economy. 43 The peasants responded to the government by slashing production to levels that met only their own needs, 4 4 contributing to the deaths of many of the millions who perished during the civil war and war communism.
5
Widespread dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, along with the sailors' Kronstadt revolt, forced Lenin to announce a New Economic Policy ("NEP") at the Tenth Party Congress in March, 1921.46 Under NEP, the government sought to restore a limited market system and end grain requisitions from the peasants. 4 7 Instead, the peasants were taxed initially "in-kind" in grain and any grain produced in excess of the tax could be sold, creating an incentive for increased production. 4 8 The peasants were also given tenure of the land, which lasted as long as they kept it cultivated. Communism, 1918 -1921 338-80 (Cambridge U Press, 1985 ("Economic Organization").
43. Thomas F. Remington, Building Socialism in Bolshevik Russia: Ideology and Industrial Organization 1917 -1921 , at 164-65 (U Pittsburgh Press, 1984 : The Nepman, 1921 -1929 (U of California Press, 1987 Small entrepreneurs called "Nepmen" were allowed to distribute goods, and for a time they controlled some 75 percent of retail trade. These Nepmen and "their agricultural counterparts, the kulaks, stimulated the economy .... -50 and agriculture was restored to pre-war levels. 5 ' In addition, urban dwellers became heavily dependent on the Nepmen for their food and clothing. 52 NEP, however, was not a success, because the government could not refrain from interfering heavily in the economy. 53 For example, commodity exchanges, which were still numbered over 100, were used for several years in the NEP period as instruments to regulate prices and curtail speculation.
54
During the NEP interregnum, the exchanges became "organs for state regulation of the market" and exchange membership was dominated by government bureaus. 55 The Moscow commodity exchange became the most important of the commodity exchanges used by the Bolshevik government during the NEP period. 56 It and other exchanges, however, were doomed to lose their appeal because of the new government's ideology. 5 7 The exchanges were believed to foster "commodity fetishism," which in communist cant was "the objectification of production relations between people under the conditions of commodity production based on private ownership." 5 8 To eliminate this fetish, the government thought it necessary to "overthrow" capitalist society. 59 Moreover, in Trotsky's words, "the socialist Political Biography, 1888 -1938 , at 273 (Oxford U Press, 1971 ) ("NEP had brought civil peace, political stability, and economic recovery ...."); Gerhard Dobbert, ed, Red Economics xi (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1932) (NEP "set the wheels going again and the chimneys smoking by the stimulus it gave to private production, small in units but vast in volume, and to private trade.").
52 Press, 1990 ). The scissors crisis was followed by the "goods famine," which was caused by governmentrepressed inflation. Alexander Erlich, The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924 -1928 , at xvi (Harvard U Press, 1960 1926 -1929 (MacMillan, 1969 organization of the economy begins with the liquidation of the market. Indeed, to the Marxist, the market, the arena for the exchange of commodities, is the heart of the capitalist economy .... The choking off of the free exchange of products and services, therefore, constituted a central objective of Bolshevik economic policy." 60 The assassination attempt of Lenin just after he visited the Moscow commodity exchange 6 ' may have further lessened the popularity of the exchanges with his government.
Operation of the commodity exchanges was abolished in 1930,62 as were the fairs, including the one at Nizhnii Novgorod.
6 3
C. Central Planning
Under Stalin, the Soviet Union found a centrally planned economy preferable to a market economy, even a mixed one like NEP. 6 4 It was Stalin's view that industrialization was needed to overcome deficiencies in the Soviet economy, which was some thirty to fifty years behind the industrial nations. Stalin also sought to increase grain supplies from the peasants to feed the urban workers. Thus began the great collectivization effort. The peasants resisted collectivization by once again decreasing their production. 67 Stalin fought back by imposing compulsory procurement of agricultural products, 68 much of which was used for export. 6 9 "Grain was seized from peasants who refused to sell at low state prices, and many local markets were closed-all of which amounted to a repeal of NEP's most fundamental principle, the right of peasants to sell grain freely. 70 "Private 60. Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution 698 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1990) . 61. Id at 806. The government was also alarmed by the fact that Nepmen were interfering with the State's grain collection efforts. The Nepmen were offering higher prices for grain and were using scarce transportation facilities in their activities. Ball, The Nepmen at 256-57 (cited in note 40).
These were not the only economic concerns of Lenin and his government. For example, the "social division of labor" in capitalist societies seemed to be a matter of particular criticism. See generally Vladimir I. Lenin The Development of Capitalism in Russia 39 (Progress Publishers, 1977) trade... became a crime, punished as 'speculation' with a sentence of five to ten years in a labor camp and loss of property." ' 7 1 This collectivization resulted in famine attended by mass murders and the uprooting of the peasantry. Although the Soviets managed to advance their industrial base, 72 millions died in this unsuccessful social experiment, 73 and much of the rest of the population lived off government rations. 7 4 Nonetheless, Stalin continued his "terror" and purges through the 1930s, arresting more millions who were put to forced labor, death, or both. 75 
D. World War II and Beyond
The Soviet Union was unable to avoid war through its non-aggression pact with Germany, 76 although it was able to harness its economy to help defeat the Nazi war machine during World War II.
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The Soviets suffered unbelievable casualties and atrocities during that conflict, as well as deep incursions into their territory. 78 They fought back with vicious determination at a time when the other Allies were still converting their economies to a wartime footing. After the Nazi defeat, the Soviet economy recovered to pre-war levels within five years 8 0 and continued to expand rapidly for several more years, 8 80. Grain relief and other aspects of the Marshall Plan played a significant role in the post-war recovery of Western Europe. Not surprisingly, however, the Soviet Union refused to participate in that program because the Marshall plan was formulated to stop communist political advances that were occurring in Europe as a result of the hardships and shortages that followed the war. MichaelJ. Hogan, The Marshall Plan, America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947 -1952 , at 43-45, 51-53 (Cambridge U Press, 1987 ; see also Charles S. Maier & Gunter Bischof, eds, The Marshall Plan and Germany 49-70 (St. Martin's Press, 1991) ; Henry Pelling, Britain and the Marshall Plan 7-27 (MacMillan, 1988) ; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Statesman 1945 -1959 , at 197-257 (Viking Press, 1987 Robert Payne, General Marshall 295-98 (Windmill Press, 1952) . Even the suggestion of Soviet participation in the Marshall Plan had, however, given rise to rightwing-based calls of treason guided by long-range economic plans that set economic production goals for the entire country. GOSPLAN, the State Planning Committee, formulated these five-year and other development plans; the first was implemented in 1928. These plans were carried out through government agencies such as Gosnab and, much later, by RAPO in the agriculture sector. As a result of its military successes, the Soviet Union emerged from World War II as a world power. However, Soviet military power, later achievements in space, and the government's strict control of information, masked serious flaws in the concept of central planning. By the 1950s, the Soviet Union's economy had begun to slow from its post-war regeneration. 8 3 In addition, the early successes with industrial recovery under central planning were unmatched in the farm sector: Stalin's collectivization had not worked, and the condition of agriculture production continued to be "deplorable. " 84 Consumer concerns were also given short shrift. Several efforts were made to improve agricultural production after Stalin's death. 8 6 For example, Nikita Kruschchev sought to cultivate the "virgin lands" in the east and in Kazakhstan. 8 7 The Soviets also began a massive effort to increase the educational level of their people, and they continued to seek to expand industrial production. 8 Still, however, the downward trend continued. Moreover, by the 1960s, the Soviet economy had become too complex for central management. 8 9 Soviet economists then began to consider introducing elements of capitalism, such as those used during the NEP period, into the economy. 90 In 1965, Premier Kosygin announced a new set of economic reforms, including the introduction of a profit motive into state enterprises. 9 planning. By the mid-1970s, even a casual visitor to the Soviet Union could not fail to observe that something was seriously wrong. Consumer shortages were endemic and housing was often squalid and crowded. The contrast between the rebuilt economies of post-war Europe (only a short plane ride away) and the Soviet Union was observable and palpable. This downward course continued into the 1980s.
9 3 It took perestroika and glasnost to awaken the Soviet public. 94 Unfortunately, many of the restructuring efforts were impractical or still retained communist concepts of unified actions. For example, President Gorbachev advocated a brigade system of workers for collective farms, with payments based on results. Socialist peer pressure in the brigades, it was assumed, would increase productivity. 9 5 Gorbachev also proposed a variation of the food tax used by Lenin during the NEP period: state production quotas were set and the collectives were allowed to sell the excess. Later, Gorbachev authorized enormous price increases for grain produced in excess of the quotas. 96 The
Communist Party Central Committee also adopted President Gorbachev's proposals for land leasing arrangements in the agricultural sector. 9 7 He was, however, forced to abandon any thoughts of breaking up the collective farms, 9 8 and agricultural production continued to be abysmal.
99
Communism and central planning simply did not work. Sixty years of central planning had demonstrated that the best that could be expected from 92. Brezhnev had unsuccessfully sought to arrest the decline by launching detente and increasing East-West trade through expanded grain purchases. Hill, Soviet Union, Politics, Economics and Society from Lenin to Gorbachev at 28 (cited in note 87). Chernenko, in turn, proposed a massive project to reclaim land that was too wet for production and irrigating land that was too dry. Thomas G. Butson, Gorbachev, A Biography 137-38 (Stein & Day, 1986 Sept 17, 1991) (food production in the Soviet Union has been dropping at an annual rate of 10% to 12%).
Collective and state farm workers have been allowed to farm "private" plots. There are also an estimated 30,000 farms that are the principal source of income of the individuals occupying them. This "private" farming, as limited as it is, is now responsible for a substantial percentage of overall agricultural production in the republics. Russia's Entrepreneurs: The Wild East, The Economist 40 (Jan 4, 1992).
[Vol. 55: No. 4 such an economy was "shoddy goods, chronic shortages and exploding inflation." 0 0 The production and distribution of commodities was simply too centralized.' 0 ' For example, "[o]ne recent Soviet study, which dealt with almost 6,000 different products, found that three-quarters of them were supplied by just one producer."' ' 02 An estimated 18 million bureaucrats in the Soviet system were trying to substitute for a market. The abolition of the exchanges at the conclusion of NEP did not stop the Soviet government from using the commodity exchanges in the United States to market grain. In 1930, apparently as part of Stalin's forced grain procurements from the peasantry, 0 5 the All-Russian Textile Syndicate traded heavily on the Chicago Board of Trade over a four day period. 0 6 These "short" sales of almost eight million bushels of wheat were initiated by "orders out of Moscow."' 1 7 The sales involved over ten percent of the trading on the Chicago Board of Trade. The Soviet sales forced market prices down, causing a great deal of concern in Chicago.' 0 8 The Chicago Board of Trade passed a resolution stating that "the selling of futures upon our exchanges by any foreign government is a new development of commerce of seriously objectionable character and it must be brought to an end."' 0 9
A congressional investigation later determined that the Soviet government had not intended to depress grain prices." t 0 The Soviets had been out of international markets for some time, and could not contract their grain sales for forward or deferred delivery. Consequently, they were left in the undesirable position of having to load their grain on ships for transport to 100. Peter Passell, A Centerless Soviet Economy May Not Be So Bad, Western Experts Say, NY Times A9 col I (Sept 5, 1991) .
101. "Gigantic enterprises now produce more than 90 percent of the Soviet Union's sewing machines, forklifts, diesel locomotives, freezers, washing machines and concrete mixers." Id.
102 market at whatever price was available. The Soviets knew that when this was made known to the world prices for grain would drop drastically, and they would receive substantially reduced prices for their grain. To avoid that result, the Soviets sold short on the Chicago markets, thereby earning a profit when grain prices dropped. Those profits were then used to offset the reduced prices they received for their sales of the actual grain. I I This, as will be discussed below, is simply a form of "hedging," which is a principal purpose of commodity exchanges in the United States."
12
A House committee originally recommended that legislation be passed to prohibit such short sales by the Soviet Union and other foreign governments. Although that legislation did not pass,"
3 the whole episode did nothing to enhance the popularity of commodity exchanges with the Soviet government. In fact, the exchanges became a favorite whipping boy for Soviet ideology. Soviet texts, for example, charged that government officials in the United States "play through their dummies on the exchange and make enormous profits.""1 4 The exchanges in the United States were also said to be operating "[u] 
Soviet Encyclopedia at 672 (cited in note 12
). Evidence to support such claims is scanty. In 1947, Harold Stassen, then a viable presidential candidate, charged that Truman Administration officials had profited from inside information on large price increases occurring on the futures markets. Congress then passed a joint resolution requiring the publication of the names of traders during that period. President Truman was deeply embarrassed to discover that his personal physician was among those profiting. Even more serious was the trading of a special assistant to the Secretary of the Army. His profits totaled over $900,000. That official denied using inside information, but he eventually resigned after Stassen charged that his "sense of right and wrong is not fully developed." RobertJ. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis 349-50 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1977) . See also Roscoe Drummond, The Case for Stassen, Life Magazine 39, 48 (March 1, 1948) (pictorial of Stassen's dramatic revelations of this event). Truman denied all knowledge of the trading and continued to defend his physician. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman -1947 , at 508, 512-13, 536-37 (US Govt Printing Office, 1963 .
A select committee of Congress also found that a leak of government commodity purchasing policies had occurred between 1946 and 1948, and that there had been a large amount of speculation in lard just prior to a government announcement affecting that commodity. The Despite lagging production, the Soviet Union became a net exporter of grain during much of the 1950s and 1960s; it was even viewed to be a potential competitor of the United States in world markets."
8 From 1963-1966, however, the Soviet Union became a net importer as a result of "disastrous harvests."'19 In 1963, to improve tense relations, President Kennedy authorized the sale of four million tons of wheat and flour to the Soviets, and further sales were made in 1964 and 1965.120 The Soviets thereafter returned to their export role for a brief period. In the 1970s the Soviet Union became a "consistent net grain importer"' 2 ' because the Soviet planners sought to add more pork and poultry to the Soviet diet, thus requiring more grain for livestock feeding. American grain producers were all too anxious to accommodate the Soviet import program. They approached the Nixon administration to ease restrictions that would inhibit the Soviet purchases. Nixon, under political pressure to support such sales, accommodated them.' 23 Specifically, he announced that grain exports to the Soviet Union (and to the People's Republic of China) would no longer be subject to the Export Control Act's 124 validated licensing requirements.
125 Nixon also rescinded the American flag shipping requirement for grain exports.' 2 6
The Soviets responded in kind. In November of 1971, they purchased some three million tons of U.S. grain. 12 7 In 1972, they purchased several times that amount, as much as twenty-five percent of the U.S. wheat crop.
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This caused large increases in consumer prices in the United States and [1987 Initially, the Soviet grain purchases were "erratic," but they began to institutionalize their purchases through long-term contracts. ' 3 ' OnJanuary 4, 1980, however, President Carter embargoed some seventeen million tons of grain that were destined for the Soviet Union as a protest of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 32 Carter's action also resulted in a brief suspension of grain trading on all U.S. commodity exchanges.' 33 Although the Soviets were able to obtain grain from alternate sources, 1 3 4 economic conditions in the Soviet Union continued the downward slide that eventually led to breakdown.
IV

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMODITY EXCHANGES IN THE UNITED STATES
The purchase and sale of commodities, by barter or otherwise, is as old as humanity.
3 5 Futures trading in various forms has been traced to 2000 B.C. (Jan 7, 1980) . This was the first time that grain had been used as a political weapon, and the president's action was exceedingly unpopular with U.S. farmers. Geoffrey Atkins, Reuters, Ltd., (NExIS) (May 4,.1980 ). To placate that very important political sector, President Carter subsequently announced that the federal government would spend over $2 billion on grain to replace the Soviet sales that were embargoed. James Vicini, Reuters, Ltd., (NExIS) (Jan 7, 1980) ; U.S. to Buy Soviet Grain Contracts, Facts on File World News Digest (NExIs) (Jan 11, 1980 (April 30, 1981) . His administration also entered into a five year agreement with the Soviets that provided for the sale of at least nine million tons of grain annually. The United States government agreed that there would be no further embargoes during the life of the agreement. Clyde H. Farnsworth, U.S. Vow on Grain Delivery, NY Times D4 col 1 (Aug 26, 1983) .
Congress later acted to restrict the ability of future presidents to embargo grain under contract. See 7 USC § 612c-3. President Reagan threatened to veto this provision but relented when it became clear that the "national emergency" exceptions to the restrictive provisions of the bill still allowed the president broad discretion to impose an embargo. H. J. Maidenberg, Options on Farm Products, NY Times DIO col 3 (Dec 20, 1982 on Bahrein Island,'1 6 as well as to Greco-Roman times.' 3 7 In Japan, futures were traded in rice "tickets" in the early 1700s, 13 8 and a primitive form of futures trading took place in America in the 1 7 90s.' 3 9 Talleyrand was among those participating in the latter market during his exile from the French Revolution.1 40 However, the modern mechanisms and flexible contractual arrangements in the United States for pricing and future sale of commodities is a phenomenon of the nineteenth century.
The westward expansion in the United States that accelerated throughout the nineteenth century created massive growth in agriculture, particularly in grains such as wheat, corn, and, later, soybeans. There was, however, no efficient marketing mechanism for those grains; available storage and transportation facilities were not sufficiently developed to disburse the grain to other market centers in an orderly fashion, particularly when much of the rail and water transportation was blocked or reduced by winter weather.' 4 ' At the end of a crop year, farmers would bring their produce to the market, which then would be inundated with grain. Prices dropped, and grain would be left to rot in the streets. Later, supplies would grow scarce, wreaking havoc on processors who needed the grain for their operations. To even out this annual boom-and-bust cycle, farmers entered into socalled "to-arrive" or "forward" contracts that provided for delivery at future dates. 1 43 In other words, these contracts provided for delivery of the grain at a time in the future. This helped stabilize the grain market because farmers could defer their deliveries and avoid flooding the market. The grain could be stored in elevators until the appointed delivery date approached. Forward contracts also assured producers of a fixed price for grain, and it allowed shippers, processors, and consumers to receive grain supplies in an orderly and efficient manner as they were needed.
4
The forward contract evolved on the Chicago Board of Trade in the 1860s into the "futures" contract, which in essence is a forward contract with standardized terms. The terms that were standardized included delivery dates, the quantity of the commodity, and its grade. The only term negotiated was the price.
14 5 Standardization made futures contracts fungible, which allowed them to be offset or liquidated before the delivery deadline, meaning that the purchaser or seller no longer needed to own or expect to take delivery of the commodity. This led to the development of an organized market where futures contracts could be offset as prices changed, allowing the realization of profit or loss without actually taking delivery of the grain.' 4 6
The creation of a futures market had important economic consequences, such as the use of futures contracts for hedging. For example, a wheat farmer satisfied with existing prices, but concerned that wheat prices might drop before the grain was harvested, could sell wheat futures short on a futures exchange. If prices dropped, the farmer would receive profits on the futures contracts that could be used to offset the losses on the actual grain when it was marketed. If prices increased, the farmer would receive increased profits on the actual grain, but those profits would be offset by the losses on the short futures positions. This hedging function operates much like an insurance 825-30 (1951); Cargill Inc. v Hardin, 452 F2d 1154 , 1158 (8th Cir 1971 Volkart Brothers, Inc. v Freeman, 311 F2d 52 (5th Cir 1962) .
The description of hedging in the text is grossly oversimplified. Among other things, a hedger must have financing available to meet margin calls, which may be substantial. Margin funds will later be recovered if the hedge is effective. But the cost of those funds may be significant, and the value of the hedge may be lost if margin funds are not available. Indeed, large out-of-pocket losses may occur in such an event. Further problems may occur because of differences in the quality of the grain being hedged and that of the grain under the futures contract, causing pricing disparities. There may also be basic pricing differences because of the different locations between the farmers' grain and the grain that is to be delivered under the futures contract. In addition, delivery is rarely taken on a futures contract. Rather, the farmer will generally offset the futures contracts and sell the actual grain separately, sometimes causing delicate timing problems. Alternatively, the farmer can engage in a complicated "exchange of futures for physicals" transaction. 149. The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 was adopted by Congress to combat the effects of excessive speculation and manipulation. 7 USC § § I et seq. In 1974, as a result of the "Great Grain Robbery" discussed in notes 123-30 and accompanying text, and other events, the Commodity Exchange Act was substantially amended. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, operation of the futures markets. Speculators add liquidity to the market and they displace the risks of the hedgers. Non-excessive speculation in the markets is permitted, if not encouraged,' 50 because "a sound futures market tends to reduce retail prices of the underlying commodities."' 5 '
Although the futures exchanges play an integral role in the distribution of commodities in the United States, they are not the only components in that process. 152 Commodities are accumulated and dispersed through a vast infrastructure of silos and grain elevators at local levels and by well-developed interstate and international transportation systems.' 53 This includes the railroads, waterways, and, particularly desirable for smaller perishable crops, an interstate and local highway system connecting most rural areas with the cities.' 54 Complementing this infrastructure is a sophisticated system of middlemen, who purchase crops from producers and redistribute them to processors and consumers. An excellent example of how the distribution system works is the manner in which foreign grain sales are effected. To illustrate, in instances where there is a large demand for grain abroad, as in the case of prior Soviet grain purchases, a large grain merchant in the United States can commit to delivery of the grain at a fixed price even though the grain merchant does not own the grain. Instead, the grain merchant purchases grain futures contracts on the Chicago Board of Trade in amounts 151. See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc v Curran, 456 US 353, 390 (1982) (discussion of the role played by speculators in the futures markets); United States v Dial, 757 F2d 163, 165 (7th Cir 1985) , cert denied, 474 US 838 (1985) (speculation increases information by providing incentives to forecast supply and demand).
152. Conversely, agricultural commodities are not the only product traded on futures exchanges in the United States. The exchanges have developed a wide array of financial products that are now trading in volumes greater than traditional agricultural futures. These financial futures and related options products are also playing an increasingly important role in the securities markets, as witnessed by the concern they caused during the stock market crash of 1987. 153. The development of the distribution system for grain in pre-revolutionary Russia in some ways paralleled that of the United States. Extending railways to areas with grain surpluses allowed development of an export trade in Russia. "In the past, a good harvest had often meant that grain surpluses had to be distilled, or even left to spoil in barns; now the surplus could be sold at home or abroad." Peter Gatrell, The Tsarist Economy 1850 -1917 , at 130 (B.T. Batsford, 1986 sufficient to cover the amount of grain that was sold abroad. The grain merchant then begins buying the actual grain from farmers, cooperatives, local elevators, and other grain merchants. 15 5 This will cause the price of grain to rise, offsetting the profit on the fixed price contract with the foreign purchaser. The grain merchant is protected, however, by the profits on the futures contracts, which should be responding in the same way as actual grain prices. 1
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As the grain merchant acquires the actual cash grain, the corresponding futures contracts are closed out by offset or otherwise. 5 7 At this point, the shipping and storage facilities of the United States provide the mechanism for assembling the actual grain and shipping it to the foreign customer.
158 This system supplies equal flexibility for the acquisition of grains and other commodities internally. 
V THE MARKET ECONOMY IDEAL EMERGES IN THE CIS
Today there seems to be a broad recognition in the CIS that a market economy and an exchange system for the distribution of commodities such as those in the United States are needed to reverse present economic conditions. As Secretary of State James Baker has observed, however, "[b]uilding democracy and free markets across the Soviet Union is not going to be an easy task after decades of totalitarianism and central planning. The work of freedom will be hard, and the transition will be painful."16 0 Shortages in food and basic consumer goods are a serious and growing concern in the CIS. The budget deficit and the insolvency of their governments pose further problems.' 6 ' Indeed, the centrally-planned distribution system has largely collapsed, and there is no functioning market system to replace it must build from scratch the market economy that was destroyed in 1917, and the CIS has no reservoir of knowledge or experience to help accomplish this transition.
63
Nevertheless, some steps toward the development of an exchange trading system have already been taken in the CIS. Commodity exchanges are already operating. 64 The Moscow Commodity Exchange, the first of these efforts, has been functioning for several months as an open market and as an alternative to the state distribution system. It has been emulated by several hundred other exchanges located in numerous cities, including St. Petersburg, Kiev, Novosibirsk, Ryazan, Ekaterinoburg, and Saratov.' 6 5 163. The confusion surrounding the changes in the political structure of the former Soviet Union will only compound the difficulty of implementing a market economy. Most of the exchanges in the CIS are operated in the form of a joint stock corporation with specified start-up capital. Usually, the shareholders include large state-owned enterprises, state distribution agencies, private cooperatives, small business enterprises, and individuals. The Moscow Commodity Exchange, for example, is registered with the Moscow City Council as a limited shareholder corporation. Its founders include the Executive Committee of the City of Moscow for the Administration of Raw Materials and Equipment Supplies and the USSR Union of Construction Industry Cooperatives. The initial capital contribution of some 12 million rubles for the exchange was to be raised by a 30% contribution from the founding members and the remainder by sales of limited equity participations. See Siberian Commodity & Stock Exchange (1991) (description of the structure and operations of a commodity exchange operating in Siberia). In April 1991, the Russian Cabinet set a minimum capital requirement of 10 million rubles for the creation of commodity exchanges. Mikhail Grigoryev, New Russian Exchange Regulations Set, Commersant 9 (April 1, 1991).
The rules and regulations governing the operations of the exchanges are adopted by exchange members. The members may also select the principal exchange manager, who hires the professional staff. As in the United States, there seems to be some tension between the roles of the professional staff and the exchange members. The latter often do not favor any participation by the staff in actual trading operations.
Moscow Commodity Exchange rules include restrictions on access to the trading floor. Only registered traders may participate. Brokers are also required to receive training before trading, and brokers may be penalized for breaking trading customs. Prices are reached by negotiations on the floor, which is arranged into trading pits. In practice, the operations of some of the exchanges are quite colorful. See David Brooks, In U.S.S.R., Possession is Better Than the Law, Wall StJ A16 col 3 (May Initially, the exchanges did not trade much in grains and oil' 66 but trading in both is now taking place on the exchanges, 6 7 which they also offer a wide variety of other goods. In the summer of 1991, for example, the exchanges in Moscow listed over two thousand items, including automobiles, paper, timber, wood products, metals, automated office equipment, construction materials, and consumer goods such as household appliances, furniture, cigarettes, and clothing.' 68 The exchanges have been characterized as "hubs of commerce, acquiring scarce goods, putting market prices on them and selling them."' 69 The total turnover in trading on these exchanges is estimated to exceed several billion rubles each month. This trading volume is, however, only a tiny portion of the economy of the former Union.' 70 The scope and size of the exchanges are limited by the fact that they are operating chiefly on an economically inefficient barter basis.' 7 ' For example, 16, 1991) (description of the Alisa Commodities Exchange which is "staffed by attractive women, some almost six feet tall, of which four feet is legs and six inches is miniskirt").
Executed transactions must be confirmed with the exchange, and the buying broker must pay a commission, which is based on a percentage of the contract price. The Russian Commodities and Raw Material Exchange agreed to restrict dividends so that exchange-imposed commission costs can be kept low. Thereafter, the value of shares in that exchange soared. (two large exchange transactions involved 100 buses and one million Japanese umbrellas). A commodity exchange for loans has also been established. One report states that in February of 1992 rates for a ruble loan were about 45%. Stolyarov, Exchange News, SovData Dialine -BizEkon News (LEXIS) (Feb 21, 1992) . A new Russian law prohibits exhange transactions in real estate, intellectual and industrial properties, and art objects. Stoliarov, Stock Exchanges, Prices, Auctions, SovData Dialine -BizEkon News (LEXIS) (February 29, 1992 (Oct 5, 1991) . Bartering is beginning to play a maJor role in the Soviet economy. The Moscow Commodity Exchange, for example, is really an auction or clearing house for goods, more akin to the pre-revolutionary trade fairs in Russia. Brian Killen, Soviet in a barter economy, a manufacturer of fans needing steel in its operations cannot simply offer a steel producer money for the steel. Instead, he must offer something the steel producer desires, which may not include fans. In one such case, a fan manufacturer obtained smoked fish for fans and exchanged the, fish for steel.' 7 2 This process results in the wasted effort of trying to match interests for barter. It is also a very poor method of price discovery or valuation of products. In contrast, a hard currency will quickly and efficiently allow the valuing of fans, smoked fish, steel, or other commodities. Barter only suggests that there is some uncertain value relationship in what may be a one-time only deal.' 73 The exchanges are reduced to bartering because the ruble is not functioning as an effective exchange medium. 174 Until that situation is remedied, there can be no effective exchange system in the republics for agricultural products. 17 (Dec 4, 1991) .
The world learned as long ago as the French Revolution that farmers will refuse to sell their grain for paper money that has been devalued by government printing presses. Schama, Citizens at 708 (cited in note 139).
scope of this article,1 7 6 but its resolution will be required for an effective exchange system. 1 77 
VI
BENEFITS OF COMMODITY EXCHANGES
The agricultural sector has proved to be the former Soviet Union's Achilles heel, 178 " 'a most critical problem for the Soviet system and its leaders.' "179 The Soviets learned as long ago as 1925 that their grain problems are twofold: it is "not enough to increase production"; it is Another point of view is that currency reform will take care of itself if a market economy can be made to function. 178. The difficulty of bringing agricultural goods into a market economy is not a problem that is either new or limited to the republics. As recognized by one author discussing the French Revolution, agricultural goods are "the most sluggish of all commodities to reach a market economy." Schama, Citizens at 190 (cited in note 139).
179. Hill, The Soviet Union, Politics, Economics and Society from Lenin to Gorbachev at 173 (cited in note 87) (citation omitted).
necessary also "to increase the volume of grain actually put on the market." 8 0 The development of modern commodity exchanges is important to solving these dual problems.' 8 ' Exchanges encourage greater production and infuse grain into the market centers for consumption.
The exchange establishes a means whereby growers can dispose of grain at market prices. This encourages farmers to produce more because they can use the excess to purchase (now barter) additional goods and luxuries. There is little incentive to produce greater amounts if the State is going to purchase the surplus at non-market prices or with an inflated ruble.' 8 2 A commodity exchange distribution system will also bring more grain to the market. One way the supply is increased is through the efforts of brokers, who receive a fee or commission to ferret out grain and bring it to the market. This practice reduces the waste and spoilage that is endemic to the republics' present distribution system. These incentives will also encourage the development of an infrastructure that will bring the republics' agricultural sector more in line with modern systems where grain merchants play the role of middlemen.
Under a commodity exchange distribution system, producers and grain merchants will see to the development of elevators and silos for grain storage, stemming some of the large losses currently incurred through improper storage. Later, in more advanced stages of development, the exchanges will allow hedging and efficient price discovery such as that found in the United States. 183 In times of actual or anticipated shortage of a particular commodity, producers will be notified of expected needs and anticipated shortages by futures price reports from the exchanges. Those price reports will reflect shortage concerns through increased price levels. Producers will then be notified of expected future demand and anticipated shortages and will be able to plan accordingly by increasing production of that commodity. In the meantime, increased prices will draw scarce commodities from external sources to alleviate the shortage. The converse will be true where there is an overproduction of a particular commodity. 182. In 1990, the Soviet government allowed about 20% of production to be marketed privately by farmers as a means to stimulate agriculture. Elisabeth Rubenfien, Americans Help Design Soviet Grain Exchange, Wall StJ A14 col 3 (Dec 14, 1990) . However, this modest step has not proved effective. Even now, grain is being withheld from distribution and is being left to rot in the fields because of a lack of market incentives. Francis X. Clines, Grim as Ever, the Thought of Winter Stalks Russia's Spirit, NY Times E3 col 1 (Sept 22, 1991) ; Steve Lohr, Aid Request Would Tax Soviet Distribution System, NY Times A4 col 3 (Sept 20, 1991); Europe Urges Rise in Soviet Aid, NY Times A4 col 1 (Oct 8, 1991) . See also Francis X. Clines, 10 Soviet Republics Agree to Coordinate Food Supply, NY Times A5 col 1 (Sept 17, 199 1) (food production in the Soviet Union has been dropping at an annual rate of 10 to 12%); Keith Bradsher, US Planning $1.5 Billion in Food Aid to Soviet Peoples Through Moscow, NY Times A6 col 4 (Nov 21, 1991) (U.S. Secretary of Agriculture advises Congress that food distribution is a serious problem in the Soviet Union and that the 1990 grain harvest will be much reduced).
See generally Western Involvement in Moscow Commodity
Exchange Urged, Milling and Baking News (June 1991) (price discovery needed in Soviet Union).
Of course, the exchanges will not themselves make a harvest successful or establish prices. They will, however, assure that commodities are produced and sold in the most efficient manner. They will also allow individual entrepreneurs to make pricing and related commercial decisions on a more rational basis.
VII STEPS NEEDED TO CREATE A COMMODITY EXCHANGE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
A number of steps are needed for the development of a modern exchange distribution system in the CIS. These include: (a) privatization of farmland and development of middlemen to market grain; (b) implementation of modern exchange trading concepts; (c) development of appropriate regulations for traders; and (d) a re-entry of the CIS into the international grain markets. Each of these steps is discussed below.
A. Privatizing the Agricultural Sector
A fundamental obstacle to the development of a market economy in the CIS is the lack of a concept of private property, which had been rejected by the former Soviet Union. A report by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development thus found that some twenty-eight percent of all grain and as much as fifty percent of all potatoes produced in the former Soviet Union were simply "lost" before reaching consumers. These losses were due to inefficiency and "the absence of private property, which means people regard state property and goods as 'belonging to no one.' "184 Privatization of state enterprises would help cure these problems and increase production and delivery in all sectors of the economy, not just agriculture. This will not, however, happen instantly, by accident, or without pain.' 8 5 Nevertheless, the concept of private ownership must be accepted and implemented before a market economy can function.' 86 Privatization must also be carried out in a manner that will stimulate distribution as well as production. Such stimulation can be provided even in 184. Half Soviet Potatoes Never Reach Consumer, Fin Times 7 col 1 (Oct 16, 1991) . 185. Early in American history, vast amounts of land were distributed by the government at very low prices. The free market, including speculators, was allowed to play a large role in that process. We should not forget, however, that distribution took place at the expense of Native Americans. Paul Johnson, The Birth of the Modern World Society 1815 -1830 , at 211-31 (Harper Collins, 1991 .
186. The whole concept of ownership must be established in the CIS. See David Brooks, In U.S.S.R., Possession is Better Than the Law, Wall St J A16 col 3 (May 16, 1991) (description of the concerns of the owner of the Alisa Commodities Exchange that the lack of ownership rights in the Soviet Union threatens entrepreneurs); Celestine Bohlen, Red Square Pageantry Gives Way to the Angry, NY Times A6 col 1 (Nov 8, 1991) (demonstrations against private ownership are held in Red Square). See generally Voucher Power, The Economist 18 (Sept 21, 1991) (giving companies away is better than keeping them in state hands); Francis X. Clines, Next: The Gold Rush on Apartments, NY Times A7 col 3 (Oct 15, 1991) (discussion of apartment auctions and black market traffic in Moscow apartments); Michael Dobbs, Crawling Toward Revolution, Washington Post AI col 3 (Dec 22, 1991) (discussing lack of understanding by the Soviet public of what a market economy entails); There Will be More Freedom, Kuranty 1 (Nov 22, 1991) .
the context of present barter arrangements; for example, farm land could be sold for production credits. That is, when arable land is distributed to private owners, it could be purchased with bushels of wheat or other grain actually delivered to a delivery point external to the farm. This does not mean delivery to the government; rather, delivery would be into the private market economy in any form so long as it was external to the farm.
7
The sale price of the land would be based on current production for, say, the next ten years or, perhaps, by an amount set by competitive auction of the land.' 8 8 Bonuses might also be in order: If, for example, present production increases by more than ten percent, that ten percent could count double in reducing the grain mortgage. The farmer should also be allowed to keep whatever currency might be received from the introduction of the grain into the production system.' 8 9 These incentives would provide a methodology for distributing the land, and they would provide incentives for increasing production and external shipments to an exchange distribution system.' 90 Middleman assistance and incentives are also needed. For example, silos and elevators will be necessary for the local and regional assemblage of grain in preparation for distribution to urban centers. Such storage facilities are needed to reduce the thirty percent or more of the republics' crop that is Nov 19, 1991) (Lithuania is utilizing a voucher system distributed on the basis of work history and age. Recipients may then use their vouchers to bid on property). The Russian government has adopted a law to authorize the selling of land to private citizens, and a government corporation is being formed to organize the use of the land in Russia. Lofenfeld, Investors are Finding Soil Beneath Their Feet, SovData Dialine -BizEkon News (LEXIS) (March 9, 1992) ; Silvanovich, The Earthly lVorries of Alexander Rutskoi, SovData Dialine -BizEkon News, (LEXIS) (March 13, 1992) . In the meantime, the land is simply being given away in Russia, Russian Farming, The Least Likely Agricultural Miracle, The Economist 71 (April 11, 1992) 188. Obviously, such auctions raise complex fairness issues. If the auctions are limited to present members of the farm units, low-ball bidding may result. Therefore, a bidding floor should be set based on past or estimated production. If outside competitive bidding is thought necessary, verification of the bidders' financial wherewithal will be needed as well as some deposit to assure that fraudulent or unrealistic bids are not submitted.
189. Cheaters in this process could be subject to civil and criminal sanctions or to the loss of their land. For example, anyone submitting false documentation of their market deliveries could be subject to such sanctions.
190. The government has used grain auctions in Moscow to induce grain to that market center. The stimulus for participation were competition for the rights to purchase automobiles at low official prices. Alexander Belozertsev, Grain Auctions in Moscow, Izvestia 1 col 3 (Feb 16, 1991) .
wasted each year.
19 1 Assistance in this area is being provided in the form of proposals to create complete distribution networks.'
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One way to stimulate development of storage and merchandising facilities like those used by grain merchant firms in the United States and other Western countries is to loan or sell property and equipment to entrepreneurs. 9 3 At early stages, these merchants should also be given loans and grants for acquiring farm equipment, seeds, fertilizer, and other commodities for barter or sale to the farmers. 194 Repayment or payment, at least partially, would be in the form of credits for the bushels of grain moved from the farmer to the market and into the hands of processors or consumers of the commodity. The United States and other Western countries could provide aid to fund these programs.' 9 5 Such assistance would be much more effective in assuring the implementation of a market economy than money spent to relieve short-term shortfalls. The latter offers nothing more than the faintest of hopes for market reform, while the former will assure its implementation.
6
The receipt of a middleman's markup or brokerage fee may be difficult for the Soviets to encourage or even swallow, much less subsidize. The concept of a broker's or middleman's profit is still viewed with some suspicion. It smacks of speculation, a matter of particular concern under Marxist theory, (1991) (description of the inadequacies of the Soviet grain transportation system). The Russian government is now transferring ownership of the existing, and inadequate, elevators and other grain storage facilities to local governments. Hopefully, they will privatize them. Resolution Defines Ownership of State Assets at Different Levels of Government, Soviet Bus Law Rpt (LEXIS) (Feb 7, 1992) .
193. The republics' harvesting machinery is particularly inefficient. Russia's Entrepreneurs : The Wild East, The Economist 40, 41 (Jan 4, 1992) . The head of one large grain firm in the United States has also been advising the republics for several years that the development of silos could save the 30% of their grain harvest that now rots each year. American Business Sees Red. For Some U.S. Companies in the Soviet Union, it's Time to Lie Low, US News & World Rpt 49, 50 (July 8, 1991) . See generally Francis X. Clines, Grim as Ever, the Thought of Winter Stalks Russia's Spirit, NY Times E3 col I (Sept 22, 1991) . Farmers from the former Soviet Union are being trained in modern farming techniques. Looking West, In Canada, Ukrainians Discover the "Lost"Art of Modern Farming, Wall StJ Al col 1 (Jan 24, 1992) . Farmers in the new Commonwealth are also husbanding their equipment in expectation of greater shortages and the loss of brigade workers to assist in the harvest. Ishkova, Harvest Prospects, SovData Dialine -BizEkon News (LEXIS) (March 4, 1992) .
194. Russia is itself planning to give some four billion dollars' worth of farm equipment to farmers. Russia, Stepping Out, The Economist 44 (Nov 2, 1991) .
195. The grain distribution system in the United States is itself heavily subsidized. Keith Bradsher, The Mixed Blessing of Empty Bins, NY Times CI col 3 (Nov 6, 1991) .
196. Middlemen incentives should also reduce the enormous amount of waste that occurs in the transportation of grain in the republics. See Mark Nicholson, Chrystia Freeland & Gillian Tett, A Long and Hungry Ride to Market, Fin Times 21 col 1 (Oct 1, 1991) (describing transportation waste in the Soviet Union).
The development of a modern distribution system in the republics will cost many billions of dollars. Alan Murray, Soviet Hunger for Help is Feast for Small U.S. Concerns, Wall StJ (Oct 23, 1991) . Unfortunately, the United States has slated only several million dollars in technical assistance to aid the Soviet Union in this area of development. Keith Bradsher, U.S. to Announce S1 Billion in Food Aid to Soviets, NY Times A4 col 4 (Nov 7, 1991) . the thought being that speculators gorge off the misery of others. 9 7 As Adam Smith recognized some two hundred years ago, however, speculators serve the function of rationing the supply of commodities.19 8 Speculators ferret out supplies and bring them to the place of demand in the most efficient manner so as to maximize their profits.' 9 9 There they charge what the market will bear. Consumers are then faced with the task of accumulating resources to purchase those goods. The amount of those resources will determine the strength of demand for goods and services.
Speculation has already become widespread in the CIS, as consumers barter and deal in the black market. 2 00 Nevertheless, obtaining official and popular recognition that speculators play a valuable role will be difficult, especially when prices increase and shortages grow, because there will be a tendency to blame "hoarders" and speculators for these ills,201 a viewpoint that may lead to an unfortunate repetition of the mistakes made during the Soviet Union's communist planning. High prices and hoarding are symptoms of a failed economy. Speculators and middlemen are the persons who obtain goods from "hoarders" by giving them an incentive to part with their goods. More importantly, they provide the incentives for greater production, thereby relieving shortages and reducing prices. The continued development of commodity exchanges in the CIS can be carried out even as the privatization process and the implementation of a hard currency are underway. For example, one needed step in the exchange development process will be the creation of forward contracts. 20 3 Here, the exchanges can learn from the American experience. Forward contracts assure the farmers that their production will be purchased for cash that can be used for necessary or discretionary purchases. This, in addition to any incentive provided by the land-for-grain purchases, will stimulate the farmers to produce maximum amounts of grain. Maximizing production will stop the current shortages that are being encountered in the republics' economies.
Forward contracts will also assure that producers maximize the use of distribution facilities, 20 4 making it unnecessary to bring all of the grain to urban centers at harvest time, which only results in great waste in produce and snarled transportation facilities, as well as requiring a mini-mobilization of the army and students to assist in the harvest. Forward contracts require the grain only when it is needed. Therefore, it can be stored locally or regionally until needed at an urban center or even at a far removed processing plant. In that regard, the use of forward contracts will encourage, indeed mandate, the building of storage facilities for the grain until the forward contracts require its delivery. Several practical problems must also be overcome before an effective exchange distribution system will function in the CIS. For example, the people will need to be educated about the role and use of commodity markets. In this regard, technical assistance is needed to develop expertise on how exchanges function in a market economy and how exchanges conduct their everyday affairs. Such assistance is being supplied by exchanges in the United States. In November 1990, the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange signed memoranda of understandings with an agency of the Government of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation government, and the Moscow City Council. Pursuant to those memoranda, the Chicago exchanges have provided materials and technical assistance to the Moscow Commodity Exchange and to the Ryazan Commodity Exchange. The Chicago exchanges are further planning to create teaching programs for specialists from the Soviet exchanges. If commodity trading is to be effective, modern communication facilities must also be developed to convey market quotations and execution orders to users of the markets throughout the CIS.
20 7 This will require an effort comparable to that of MCI's development of an alternate communications network in the United States, 20 8 only the task will be of greater magnitude.
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The United States and other countries can provide assistance to the CIS in establishing communications systems. This area is amenable to joint ventures, and the development of communication facilities would also be appropriate for aid grants from other governments. In addition, the CIS will need advice on developing trading systems that will handle the entry orders and their posting on the floor, as well as computers for processing and matching orders for confirmation and settlement. The CIS exchanges appear to be receiving such advice from the Chicago exchanges and elsewhere. 2 10 A Swedish company has also agreed to establish an electronic trading system for order entry and execution on the commodity exchange in what is now St. Petersburg.
2 1 '
Another concern is the high rate of default on the fledgling exchanges in the CIS, such as where promised goods are not delivered or they are something other than what was promised. 21 2 To deal with such problems, the exchanges must develop a clearing-house system such as that found on other exchanges around the world. Once more, the CIS can benefit from the experience of the Western exchanges. Clearing houses provide facilities for matching trades, settling positions, and reducing counterpart risks by performance guarantees. 2 13 This means that if one party fails to perform on the contract, the clearing house will assume the responsibility for performance in damages or by delivery itself. Only the creditworthiness of the clearing house needs to be considered, not the individual credit of the opposite party. 21 4 Performance may further be secured by margin requirements.
1 5
Equally important to the exchanges will be the development of dispute resolution systems to deal with traders that default, quality and grade disputes, and trade report, execution, and other errors. There are no commercial courts in the CIS comparable to those in Western countries. 21 6 Therefore, some alternate dispute resolution systems, such as arbitration, are needed. Arbitration may be the most desirable in that it is a popular mechanism for dispute resolution on exchanges around the world. The CIS could, for example, adopt arbitration procedures such as those used on commodity exchanges in the United States.
7
The exchanges must develop some standardized contract terms for agricultural commodities. 218 With these steps accomplished or underway, the next stage of exchange development in the CIS will involve the adoption of futures contracts, which will offer multiple benefits to the economy. Here again, the CIS could learn create a bank that will provide exchange credits and act as a clearing house. The exchanges have formed a Congress of Exchanges to develop exchange clearing systems, arbitration, and other uniform measures needed for the development of the exchanges. In addition, the Inter-Regional Exchange Union has been formed to promote the development of exchanges, and the Brokers' Guild has been organized to promote and protect the interests of brokers that are trading on the exchanges.
218. See generally 2 Grain Exporters at 6 (cited in note 44) (discussion of the importance of standardized grades for grain).
219. The establishment and monitoring of these and other contract terms are made conditions of exchange licensing requirements in the United States. 7 USC § § 7, 7a (1991) . Grain standards are also set and monitored by the federal government. United States Grain Standards Act, 7 USC § § 71-87h.
220. Warehouses are subject to federal and exchange regulation in the United States under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 USC § 7a, and the United States Warehouse Act. 7 USC § § 241-72.
221. Delivery points are subject to the approval of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in the United States in order to assure that the futures contracts are not susceptible to price manipulations. 7 USC § 7a(10).
222. (1991) . from the American experience. Since futures contracts are standardized, they can be used to hedge commercial risks. This will allow producers to stabilize the prices paid for goods used in production. Price stability is a matter of particular concern during inflationary periods such as the one the CIS is now experiencing. Futures contracts also standardize commodity qualities and quantities, allowing for easier financing and greater confidence for those dealing in the commodity. The use of a clearing house, as noted, also removes counter-party risk, a particularly troubling problem in a developing economy. The elimination of that risk will greatly facilitate commodity transactions and distribution.
2 2 3 C. Regulatory Concerns
The development of commodity exchanges in the CIS will not be without costs. In addition to the incentive and implementation costs already mentioned, there will be serious abuses, especially by those seeking advantage in the formative stages of the exchanges. 22 4 The United States paid a severe price for the manipulations that were regularly carried out during the early days of exchange trading. Those manipulations caused hardships for farmers and consumers, and they resulted in economic inefficiency when supplies were diverted to market centers by artificial prices that did not reflect actual demand for the commodity. 2 25 The exchanges are always susceptible to fraudulent trading practices, as was dramatically evidenced by the recent FBI undercover operations in Chicago, which disclosed widespread cheating of customers. 226 The CIS would, therefore, be well advised to study the American experience. The public and market participants will not have confidence in markets that are subject to manipulation and fraud, and it is the government's duty to safeguard against such abuses. Such safeguarding must include prosecution of those engaging in such activities and regulatory safeguards against abuses. A study of the securities and commodity regulatory schemes in the United States would be useful in that regard. 22 7 The greatest dangers to the exchanges, however, is that the government will not limit itself to such a narrow role. The temptation to regulate rising prices by restricting exchanges activities is almost as irresistible as it is futile. Exchanges will operate successfully only if market forces, rather than government bureaucrats, are free to set prices. The exchanges should be allowed to regulate themselves to the maximum extent possible, with government regulation strictly limited to preventing fraud, manipulation, and other abuses. 
D. The International Markets
The exchanges in the CIS are now acting on many of these issues, but efforts must also be made to bring them back into the international grain markets. 22 9 The commodity exchanges are playing an increasing role in commercial exports. In the first instance, however, the focus of concern will be on the distribution of grain contributed during relief efforts from surplus stocks of Western countries. 2 30 The republics could also assist themselves in obtaining foreign grain even without a strong currency. For example, oil and other commodities produced in the republics could be traded until their currency is put on a stable footing. 2 3 1 One publication has also suggested that higher quality wheat produced in the CIS could be swapped for feed grain found in international markets. 2 3 2 Of course, the republics should move to wean themselves from the need for importing feed grain by encouraging the production of fodder. 23 3
• VIII CONCLUSION "Ever since the collectivisation in the early 1930s, agriculture has been an outstanding weakness of the Soviet economy. No other branch appears so riddled with economic absurdities .... ."234 Despite a record harvest in 1990, shortages developed and transportation bottlenecks caused grain to pile up on sidings throughout the former Soviet Union. Spoilage and waste then took a massive toll; farmers refused to sell to the state and crops were reduced because there was little incentive to plant or harvest a large crop. 2 35 The collective farms clearly understand that selling grain to their government is not economically prudent; instead, they are using grain for animal feed and as additional payments to their workers, who use it in barter transactions.
The farms will not easily be enticed to part with their grain, and the shortage of middlemen and the lack of an efficient exchange distribution system pose formidable barriers to the implementation of a market economy. Incentives are needed to "jump start" the introduction of agricultural commodities into the economy of the republics and to stimulate the production of maximum amounts of grain or other agricultural products.
These incentives would include land for grain exchanges as part of the privatization process. The existence of middlemen to bring the grain to market is also critical to the development of a market economy. These merchants also need incentives and assistance. Loans and grants to (Nov 12, 1991) (Soviets "spent twice as much subsidizing meat in the 1980s as they did on health care").
The Ukraine is already asking the United States for assistance in new technology to increase grain production. Clifford Krauss, Ukrainian Leader and Bush Confer, NY Times A6 col 4 (Sept 26, 1991 1991) ; Craig R. Whitney, Aid at Any Price, NY Times A7 col 1 (Sept 12, 1991) ("With the winter fast approaching, and the harvest mostly still lying around in the fields waiting for the rains to rot it because the infrastructure of agricultural machinery and transport equipment has collapsed, the Soviets have already begun asking for help in feeding themselves."). middlemen for grain delivered to market would provide the incentives needed for distribution of grain to the market centers where it is needed.
Assistance will also be needed to foster exchanges in the republics. This will include communication facilities and technical assistance in establishing clearing mechanisms and dispute resolution procedures. By developing an exchange trading system, the republics can transport and process commodities in an orderly, rational and efficient manner. Funding for these incentives, communication facilities, and technical assistance would, in large measure, depend on grants from the West.
These proposals will be costly, but they will be more efficient than a relief effort that contains no stimulus for conversion to a market economy. The CIS is already asking for billions of dollars in aid to feed its population. 23 6 Simply supplying grain for immediate consumption, however, will only prolong the misery of the conversion process. 23 7 The program suggested above would provide incentives needed for the creation of a market economy that will hopefully eliminate the current shortages in the republics. These incentives would also increase the demand for a stable currency. When the recommended production incentives are exhausted, the existence of a hard currency could then serve its appropriate role as a medium of exchange and store of value that will assure maximum production, just as in any efficient market economy. 
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